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Abstract A series of studies has shown that civil wars are caused not only by
factors inside countries, but also by effects operating across state borders+Whereas a
first wave of quantitative studies demonstrated that such effects make the “closed-
polity” assumption untenable, more recently researchers have identified particular
causal mechanisms driving conflict+ Despite these recent advances, a central puzzle
remains unresolved, namely why ethnic groups that at least in theory could count on
support from large transborder ethnic kin ~TEK! groups often have remained surpris-
ingly peaceful, such as the stranded Russian populations in the “near abroad+” We
propose a theoretical framework that extends the analysis from the primary dyad
between the incumbent and the challenger group by adding a secondary dyad that
pits the incumbent against the TEK group+ We postulate a curvilinear effect of the
TEK group’s relative size on conflict onset+ Using a new data set on transnational
ethnic links, we find that that the risk of conflict increases within the middle range of
the size spectrum, consistent with our main hypothesis+ This means that large TEK
groups have a conflict-dampening effect, provided that they control their own state+
Excluded TEK groups, however, are not associated with lower conflict probabilities+
Beyond the clear importance of domestic opportunities and grievances, civil wars
are often influenced by the wider international environment+A series of recent stud-
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ies has shown that such violence is caused not only by factors inside countries, but
also by effects operating across state borders+1 Whereas a first wave of quantita-
tive studies demonstrated that such effects make the “closed-polity” assumption
untenable, more recently researchers have identified particular causal mechanisms
driving conflict, including the role of transborder ethnic kin ~TEK! in conflict pro-
cesses+ In contrast to earlier contributions to this literature, which tended to stress
identity as the key motivating factor, contemporary scholarship typically high-
lights how the conjunction of ethnicity and power politics increases the risk of con-
flict, suggesting that “identity politics is often more about politics than about
identity+”2
Despite these recent advances, a central puzzle remains unresolved, namely how
ethnic groups that at least in theory could count on support from large TEK groups
often have remained surprisingly peaceful+ The most prominent dog that failed to
bark in this sense are the Russians in the “near abroad+” There was widespread
anticipation that the Russian diasporas stranded in former Soviet republics after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s would resort to violence, but these
communities have remained relatively calm+ However, the picture looks entirely
different if we consider the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia, or the Armenians
in Azerbaijan+ These groups have been involved in major fighting with active sup-
port from TEK groups+ Given a similar pattern of domestic marginalization and
cross-border ethnic kin, why then do some groups rebel while others do not?
We seek to ascertain whether there is any systematic link between the trans-
national ethno-demographic balance and the probability of conflict+We conjecture
that the effect is not linear: as the size and power of TEK groups rise, conflict
should be more likely, but very strong kin groups—such as the Russians—can in
fact deter conflict+ Our argument has been anticipated by others+ In an article on
“hypotheses on nationalism and war” that appeared shortly after the end of the
Cold War, Van Evera proposed the existence of such a curvilinear effect+3 Offer-
ing a more thorough theoretical derivation, Van Houten addressed the same puz-
zle, arguing that large external states controlled by TEK groups could have a
pacifying effect on ethnic politics+4 Yet the author also admits that his study should
be seen as a plausibility probe rather than a definitive test, since the evidence is
limited to selected case studies+ Thus, almost two decades after the publication of
Van Evera’s initial conjecture, it remains uncertain if the postulated conflict-
reducing TEK effect holds+
We test whether the curvilinear proposition applies more generally+ Progress in
data collection now allows us to evaluate this proposition systematically across a
large number of cases+ Drawing on a new transnational extension to the Ethnic
1+ See Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; and Gleditsch 2007+
2+ See King and Melvin 199902000, 109; Thyne 2006; and Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009+
3+ Van Evera 1994+
4+ Van Houten 1998+
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Power Relations ~EPR! data set, we find strong quantitative support for the hypoth-
esis+ Indeed, the propensity of conflict is highest for TEK groups with intermedi-
ate relative sizes+ As “power parity” theories would expect, external groups that
have approximately the same size as the incumbent groups tend to see the most
conflict+ However, there are important differences regarding the TEK group’s power
status+ Contrary to common fears about the dangers of irredentism, our results
show that if transnational communities happen to control their respective states,
this influence has a conflict-dampening impact for large groups+ Where the TEK
group is stateless, however, one cannot count on such a reduction of conflict risk+
The Literature on Transborder Ethnic
Kin and Conflict
There is little consensus in the literature on how TEK influence civil war out-
break+ In fact, virtually all conceivable causal relationships have been proposed at
some point or another, including both positive and negative influences, as well as
no connection at all+ Some studies argue that TEK groups have offensive motives
linked to ethnic nationalism and postulate a positive effect on conflict+ In particu-
lar, aggressive interventions driven by irredentism could trigger a spiral of esca-
lating tensions on both sides of the border+5 It is not difficult to find examples of
such border-transgressing processes in the wars that led to the breakup of the for-
mer Yugoslavia+ Although most of this literature relies on qualitative evidence,6
some scholars have conducted quantitative tests, usually based on Minorities at
Risk ~MAR! data, that generally detect a positive impact on conflict exerted by
TEK groups+7
From the vantage point of bargaining theory, Cetinyan contends that group sizes
and transnational kin groups should not influence the probability of conflict onset+8
This interpretation recognizes that demands vary with a group’s demographic
weight, but rejects any implications for the outbreak of violence+ Potential threats
from external kin, Cetinyan argues, should be reflected in domestic bargaining
processes as groups with strong TEK ties receive greater concessions from the
state+ Cetinyan’s analysis is creative, but there are at least two reasons to doubt his
theoretical and empirical null effect+ First, the restricted sample of groups in the
MAR data, which are by construction limited to threatened minorities, make them
less suitable for general tests of demographic size+ Second, Cetinyan’s model rules
out the possibility that relative group size could be correlated with uncertainty+ By
contrast, a number of scholars postulate a curvilinear relationship between the two,
5+ Weiner 1971+
6+ See, for example, Jenne 2007; Horowitz 1985; Chazan 1991; and Heraclides 1990+
7+ See Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 2001; and Woodwell 2004+
8+ Cetinyan 2002+
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since strategic misrepresentation is most effective at parity+9 We present a similar
argument+ In fact, the conflict literature has also postulated similar nonlinear effects,
such as the influence of regime type10 and ethnic fractionalization+11
In an attempt to overcome some of the sample restrictions associated with the
MAR data by relying on alternative, group-level data, Cederman, Girardin, and
Gleditsch find that TEK groups increase the probability of internal conflict by shift-
ing the shape of the observed effects of the power balance between the groups asso-
ciated with the rebels and the incumbent government+12 While innovative in its use
of geographic information systems, their article has a limited scope+ First, the data
on ethnic groups depend directly on the Soviet Atlas Narodov Mira,13 which are
defined primarily based on language, and may not correspond to the relevant iden-
tities+14 Moreover, the data are from the 1960s and could thus be outdated ~even
though ethnic settlement patterns are surprisingly stable over time!+ Second, their
analysis is limited to Eurasia, thus leaving cases in Africa and the Western Hemi-
sphere outside the analysis+ Third, and most importantly, their model does not fac-
tor in the size of the TEK group itself, and therefore does not speak to the size puzzle+
In an early discussion of “hypotheses on nationalism and war” mentioned ear-
lier,Van Evera develops a subtle argument stating that TEK groups will be less likely
to intervene if rescue is either impossible or relatively easy+ It is, instead, “in-
between situations + + + that are most dangerous+”15 However, Van Evera’s article
never moves beyond listing hypotheses accompanied by selected case illustrations+
Relatedly, Van Houten offers a more sophisticated attempt to explain the rela-
tive peacefulness of the Russian near abroad and similar cases+16 Focusing on kin
states, referred to as “reference states,” Van Houten extends Fearon’s theory of
credible commitments from minority-majority relations to transborder actors+17 Not-
ing that Fearon’s argument overpredicts violence in cases such as the Baltic states,
he argues that external relations may pacify domestic settings under specific con-
ditions+ It is true that irredentist intensions may exist among strong states in which
case conflict is very likely+ However, ceteris paribus, a stronger reference state
should stabilize minority-majority relations: “the presence of a militarily strong
but only moderately irredentist reference state is most likely to overcome the com-
mitment problem and prevent ethnic violence+”18 Thus, strong external kin states
are in a much better position to make credible threats to intervene than their weaker
counterparts:
9+ See, for example, Walter 2009; and Reiter 2003+
10+ Hegre et al+ 2001+
11+ Sambanis 2001+
12+ Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009+
13+ Bruk and Apenchenko 1964+
14+ Ibid+ The geocoded groups are introduced in Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman 2010+
15+ Van Evera 1994, 20+
16+ Van Houten 1998+
17+ Fearon 1998+
18+ Van Houten 1998, 119–20+
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On the one hand, if it is known that the reference state is likely to intervene
in the new state if the minority is oppressed, then the ruling majority in the
new state has an incentive to protect the minority+ This threat allows the major-
ity to credibly commit to do this+ On the other hand, if the reference state is
too aggressive, it may induce a war with the new state+19
Recognizing the difficulties of testing an argument that hinges on intensions, Van
Houten limits the application of his game-theoretic model to a small number of
cases in Eastern Europe: “I make no attempt to actually prove the correctness of
the model; rather, I try to show its plausibility+”20 Thus, building on and further
developing Van Houten’s ideas, we attempt to go beyond establishing plausibility
by testing our hypotheses systematically across a large number of cases+
Theorizing the Effect of Transborder Ethnic Kin
Following pioneering conceptual work by Weiner21 and Brubaker,22 we start our
theoretical derivation of the TEK effect by identifying the ethno-nationalist triad
as the critical constellation of actors within which border-transgressing influences
on conflict operate+An ethno-nationalist triad can be conceptualized as an extended
center-periphery configuration by adding the TEK group to the primary dyad, which
involves the group challenging the power of an incumbent ethnic group+ Through
the addition of a TEK group on the challenger’s side, the incumbent is now faced
with an additional potentially opposed actor in a secondary dyad+ The presumably
supportive relationship between the TEK group and the challenger constitutes the
third leg of the triad+ Figure 1 illustrates the full triadic actor constellation, includ-
ing the primary and secondary dyads+
By referring to incumbents, challengers, and TEK groups, we avoid the confus-
ing and potentially misleading terminology labeling the first two actors as major-
ity and minority groups+ Rather, we highlight the importance of the ethno-political
power+ As illustrated by many cases of minority rule, including apartheid South
Africa and modern-day Syria, the incumbent group at the political center may be
a numerical minority and the excluded challenger group~s! in majority+ Such sit-
uations are especially conflict prone+
Although our theoretical framework could in principle be extended beyond neigh-
boring states, we focus on such relations for the simple reason that external inter-
vention is much more feasible in terms of logistics under such circumstances+
Indeed, long-distance nationalism involving diaspora has also been listed as a pos-
19+ Ibid+
20+ Ibid+, 119–20 ~emphasis in original!+
21+ Weiner 1971+
22+ Brubaker 1996+
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sible source of conflict,23 as has funding of rebel campaigns in the developing
world through diaspora of migrants in the United States+24 These conflict mecha-
nisms are different from our concern, since we focus entirely on transborder eth-
nic kin+ It is true that demonstration effects may inspire protest across vast distances+
However, few countries have the ability to project force across long distances, and
such kin group connections are less relevant for threat perceptions+Moreover, TEK
groups in adjacent countries can more readily offer support to their kin across the
border, for example, by helping to set up rebel sanctuaries+25
Although our actor constellation is based on ethnic groups and focuses on mech-
anisms governed by demographic conditions, the agency of ethnic groups as col-
lective actors has often been questioned in the literature+ In the classical treatment
of collective action, Olson expects free riding to undermine the effectiveness of
large groups’ efforts+26 More recently, experts on conflict and ethnicity have crit-
icized the reliance on ethnic groups as the unit of analysis+27 For sure, many osten-
sible groups may not live up to the full “groupness” of such units, because their
outer boundaries are highly fluid and their political decision making may be so
muddled that no rational or coherent agency can be said to exist at the group level+
For this reason, the cohesion of ethnic groups should be seen as a variable, at least
in principle+ In most cases, however, there are still good reasons to expect ethnic
groups to be relatively cohesive and sufficiently stable to warrant conflict analysis
of the type we propose+ Ultimately, if our assumption of groups as units of analy-
23+ For example, Shain and Barth 2003+
24+ Collier and Hoeffler 2004+
25+ Salehyan 2009+
26+ Olson 1965+
27+ See Brubaker 2004; and Kalyvas 2008+
FIGURE 1. The ethno-nationalist triad
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sis turns out to be deeply flawed, it should be impossible to find any clear empir-
ical results based on ethnic groups as units of analysis+
Since demographic group size is relatively easy to measure, and tends to be
exogenous to conflict except under extreme cases of ethnic cleansing, we rely on
this dimension to reflect power in our theory+ Although there are instances where
the participants of conflict processes constitute tiny fractions of the group’s pop-
ulation, such as ruthless warlords and armed bands, we expect the size of the group
to be relevant to conflict onset in most cases, both in terms of potential resources
and overall support or legitimacy as a share of a country’s population+
Our main task, then, is to study the probability of violence within the primary
dyad and to what extent this conflict process involves the TEK group through the
secondary dyad+Assuming that a nationality conflict breaks out between the incum-
bent group~s! and the challenger, we derive the conditions of conflict as a func-
tion of the conditions within the primary and secondary dyads+
Analyzing the Conditions of Conflict Within the Primary Dyad
At least since the French Revolution, state sovereignty, and political legitimacy
more widely, have been defined through the popular will+ Wherever alien rule
applies, leaders of the excluded groups are likely to harbor grievances against the
incumbent state-controlling elites+28 Under specific conditions, these tensions
increase the probability that the disadvantaged and excluded groups will resort to
violence+29 Most obviously, the more pronounced the frustrations felt by the group
in question, the more likely armed resistance becomes, especially where the path
to peaceful change is blocked+
However, beyond popular grievances and demand for justice, the likelihood of
violent conflict could also be influenced by the power balance within the primary
dyad+ After all, mere frustration does not suffice to challenge the state’s power;
violent change requires resources and organization in addition to motive+30 While
Olson’s classical theory of collective action postulates a negative relationship
between group size and coordinated action at the group level because of the ero-
sion of solidarity in large groups, other authors adopt a less radically individualist
perspective by stressing how cognitive,31 emotional,32 and organizational mecha-
nisms33 allow group leaders to tap resources in proportion to the size of the group
in question+
28+ Gellner 1983, 1+
29+ See Goodwin 1997; Gurr 2000; Petersen 2002; and Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010+
30+ Tilly 1978+
31+ Goldstone 2001+
32+ Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005+
33+ See Tilly 1978; and Gould 1991+
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We postulate a positive, monotonic relationship between group size and conflict
for reasons relating to both opportunities and motivations+34 Assuming at least min-
imal cohesion, other things being equal, then groups with larger populations should
be able to mobilize more resources to challenge the government’s power, in terms
of potential fighters and other types of material support+
We also expect demographic scope to be correlated with motivations to the extent
that larger groups can claim more legitimacy within a political system, both in terms
of actual votes in democracies or potential influence in authoritarian systems+ In
the modern, nationalist era, minority rule should be especially problematic+ Wher-
ever majorities—or at least large segments of the population—are deprived of polit-
ical power, fundamental principles of democracy and national self-determination
are by definition violated+ Focusing on the relative size of the challenger group com-
pared to the size of the incumbent groups, we propose our first hypothesis:
H1. The probability of conflict increases with the relative size of the challenger
group in the primary dyad+
Analyzing the Conditions of Conflict Within the Secondary Dyad
Before discussing the different ways that the TEK group’s size can affect the pro-
pensity of political violence, we consider a categorical effect+ Such a formulation
would be compatible with a strictly essentialist interpretation of ethnic kin that is
unrelated to power relationships+As a reflection of strong ethnic solidarity, all TEK
groups should be highly motivated to intervene+ According to this approach, such
groups are motivated by “reasons of affinity and sentiment rather than + + + power
or more hard-headed cost-benefit analyses+”35 Based on this essentialist logic, we
derive the following hypothesis:
H2. The probability of conflict increases in the presence of a TEK group+
We expect this hypothesis to be false+ Although clearly emotionally loaded, ethnic
politics is as much about power and politics as it is about ethnic solidarity:
Disputes over the allocation of scarce resources, competing visions of foreign
policy directions, domestic political contests, and other prosaic features of polit-
ical life frequently trump any putative duty that political elites might feel toward
individuals who share their language or culture beyond their own frontiers+36
Whether orchestrated by state-owning or state-seeking ethnic kin, interventions in
transborder conflicts are a risky business that can have massively negative conse-
34+ For a justification of these assumptions, see Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009+
35+ See Holsti 1996, 127; and Connor 1994+
36+ King and Melvin 199902000, 109+
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quences for the TEK group in question+37 Indeed, it is not surprising that quanti-
tative studies have generally failed to find support for the simple hypothesis that
the presence of a TEK group by itself influences conflict+
An alternative account takes power politics more seriously by letting the prob-
ability of conflict increase with the relative demographic weight of the TEK group
compared to the incumbent+ The larger the group, the more confident it will be
that its intervention will contribute to the successful challenge of the government
in the primary dyad without exposing it to inordinate risks+ Similarly, powerful
secondary dyads encourage groups in the primary dyad to radicalize and articulate
larger demands, which can lead to violence+38 This logic runs parallel to that of
H1 in the primary dyad by using relative demographic weight as a rough measure
of the dyadic power balance:
H3. The probability of conflict increases with the relative size of the TEK group in
the secondary dyad+
There are few examples of empirical studies measuring power relations in the sec-
ondary dyad and those that do typically find no proportional effect+ For example,
in their quantitative investigation of irredentism, Saideman and Ayres do not detect
any influence of relative group size, which is also in line with Cetinyan’s find-
ings+39 Nonetheless, we include this hypothesis and test it using our new data
resource+
But there are also important theoretical reasons to discount this hypothesis+ H3’s
monotonic effect of TEK group size fails to account for the puzzle of the Russian
near abroad, because it overlooks the strategic nature of the secondary dyad+ As
the size of the TEK group increases, the challenger in the primary dyad will have
access to more resources, but the incumbent regime should also take this into
account when bargaining with the group+ We have postulated a linear effect of
group size on conflict in the primary dyad, but there are good reasons to believe
that such a relationship needs to be amended when it comes to the influence of the
secondary dyad+ Why should large, powerful TEK groups be able to “protect”
their kin, but large groups in the primary dyad be more associated with conflict?
Deviating somewhat from Van Houten’s emphasis on commitment problems, we
propose two causal mechanisms that generate the same relationship between the
size and conflict variables+
First, large challengers in the primary dyad are relatively unlikely to extract
bargaining concessions by threatening ruling minorities+Majority groups challeng-
ing minority incumbents will remain excluded from state power unless there are
exceptional circumstances that make small ruling coalitions unstable+ Some small
37+ Horowitz 1985+
38+ Jenne 2007+
39+ See Saideman and Ayres 2000; and Cetinyan 2002+
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ruling coalitions—such as the white apartheid government in South Africa—
established their dominance through successful coercion, and managed to cling to
power for decades+ Oppressive incumbents are unlikely to compromise with chal-
lengers because they fear that concessions will threaten their long-term survival
and the benefits of rule+ Going down the reform path may lead to the dissolution
of the regime at best, and exile, imprisonment, or death at worst+ Thus, elites defend-
ing minority rule will be inclined to rely heavily on coercion to stifle challenges
to their supremacy+40
However, such an uncompromising attitude may be much less viable if over-
whelming external groups get involved+ While incumbents have greater means to
maintain control domestically, transnational actors are inherently more difficult to
police and coerce since they can mobilize resources beyond the shadow of repres-
sion+41 Because of the potential threat posed by such interventions, we would expect
incumbent regimes to be mindful of ethnic opposition groups’ respective “home-
lands+” In other words, large domestic challengers—while potentially threatening—
can be successfully controlled by the state’s coercive apparatus, but large external
challengers are much more difficult to deal with+
This type of caution should increase with the TEK group’s size relative to the
incumbent group+ Stated differently, the incumbent’s willingness to risk violent
conflict should be a decreasing function of the TEK group’s size+ Yet since the
probability of conflict results from both opportunity and willingness, the combi-
nation ~that is, multiplication! of external resources and external treats produces a
curvilinear effect+ For small TEK groups, the conflict propensity would be close
to 0 since these groups would make little difference even if they intervene+ Where
the TEK groups are relatively large, however, states will be more constrained in
their behavior because of the deterrent effect of a possible intervention+
Drawing on bargaining theory, there is a second reason to expect the midrange
of TEK sizes to be more conflictual+ Originally applied by Blainey to interstate
relations, this argument hinges critically on uncertainty and strategic incentives to
misrepresent one’s true strength+42 According to this reasoning, conflicts are espe-
cially likely to break out where the power balance is roughly even+43 Rough parity
makes it difficult for the parties to assess who would prevail in case of combat,
and so attempts to misrepresent gain significance+44 Conflict may then occur as
the result of information problems leading to bargaining failure+45 While this rea-
soning has generally not been extended to civil wars, which are typically thought
to be caused by commitment problems,46 there are clear reasons to believe that
40+ Heger and Salehyan 2007+
41+ Salehyan 2009+
42+ Blainey 1973+
43+ Reiter 2003+
44+ See Geller 1993; Lemke and Werner 1996; and Wagner 2000+
45+ Fearon 1995+
46+ For example, Fearon 1995 and 1998+
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uncertainty could be a cause of conflict in such settings+ For example,Walter points
to obvious sources of uncertainty, such as the sources of rebel financing and gov-
ernmental resolve, to which one might add the extent of popular mobilization on
either side+47
Yet, the lack of information should be even more pronounced regarding the pos-
sible involvement of TEK groups+ Transnational interactions will tend to be much
less transparent than domestic politics+ This fundamental information asymmetry
is especially severe for the incumbent, because its intelligence services are likely
to encounter much more resistance in their attempts to gather information about
the resources and intentions of foreign groups+48 To some degree, the situation
resembles the difficulties surrounding extended deterrence in international rela-
tions, which is especially challenging to handle+ Primarily the challenge derives
from the uncertainty and lacking credibility surrounding third parties’ propensity
to intervene in defense of proxy states+49 Thus, both in terms of estimating the
capability balance in the TEK group’s favor and its willingness to intervene, con-
siderable uncertainties will be present, especially when approaching power parity+
Furthermore, these uncertainties should dwarf the corresponding sources of ambi-
guity in domestic politics+
We thus present our main hypothesis regarding the functional form of the TEK
effect:
H4. The probability of conflict follows an inverted U-shape for the relative size of
the TEK group in the secondary dyad+
So far, our hypotheses have said nothing about the influence of TEK links on
conflict compared to situations that feature no kin at all+ Whether the TEK group
is included in, or excluded from, executive power in their own state exerts a medi-
ating effect+ The most straightforward argument focuses on the superior power of
state-controlling TEK+ Other things being equal, we would expect TEK groups
that control a state to be more powerful+ Yet as we have argued, the relative power
balance in the secondary dyad should constrain conflict as TEK groups become
more threatening+ While we focused on power-as-population earlier, control of a
state and its military apparatus should augment power even further+ Thus, while
ethnic Russians and ethnic Chinese are numerically large in global terms, they are
even stronger than their size alone would suggest because they control powerful
states+ Marginalized TEK groups, on the other hand, may be willing and able to
mobilize resources for their kin in their primary state+ Yet, there will be consider-
able uncertainty over the resources and support that they can garner because their
capabilities are unknown and resource pools are insecure+ TEKs that control states
47+ Walter 2009+
48+ Salehyan 2009, 48+
49+ For example, Huth 1988+
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usually operate through official diplomatic channels and have known resource
streams and capabilities, which bolster credible threats and reduce bargaining
uncertainty+
In addition, we must consider the TEK group’s willingness to intervene+ Incum-
bent groups have much more to lose than stateless groups, especially in the case
of multiethnic polities that could be seriously destabilized by actions that under-
mine the sanctity of borders+50 International norms of territorial integrity applying
to states, rather than to nonstate actors, should also restrain incumbent groups from
interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring states+51 In contrast, TEK groups
without access to power, such as the Kurds in Turkey, are less bound by such
rules and are generally more likely to have experienced military action as a con-
sequence of their marginal position+
In short, TEK groups that control a state can “talk softly and carry a big stick+”
They are more able to intervene given their control over military forces and these
credible threats should be reflected in bargaining in the primary dyad+ They may
be more reserved in their use of force, given international norms against war, but
can still bring the power of the state to bear in diplomatic relations+ Marginalized
TEK groups on the other hand, do not face similar constraints+ Support for their
kin may be uncertain and difficult to mobilize since they do not have the same
military capabilities+ For these reasons, large included TEK groups tend to deter
conflict, while excluded TEK groups can foster bargaining uncertainty and pro-
mote conflict+ Thus, we state our final hypothesis:
H5. The conflict-dampening effect occurs for relatively large TEK groups that are
included, and not for those that are excluded+
Data
Assessing our hypotheses empirically requires suitable data on ethnic groups and
their transnational connections in a wide and unbiased sample+ Thus, we extend
the EPR data set to encompass transborder links+ The coding of EPR relies exten-
sively on expert input, both through an online survey and workshops+52 In its cur-
rent version, EPR-ETH, the data set contains information about politically relevant
ethnic groups around the world from 1946 through 2009+53 Political relevance is
defined by including groups that are active in national politics and0or directly dis-
criminated against by the government+
50+ See Horowitz 1985; and Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009+
51+ Zacher 2001+
52+ Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010+
53+ Ethnic Power Relations Data Set ~EPR-ETH!, Version 2+0, available at ^http:00www+icr+ethz+ch0
data&, accessed 27 October 2012+
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In agreement with constructivist principles, the ethnic identities are allowed to
vary over time, such that the political relevance or the main level of political iden-
tification may move from one level to another+ For each group and time period,
we provide the demographic weight and access to national executive power+ The
data set divides power status into three main categories depending on whether the
group in question ~1! controls power alone, ~2! shares power, or ~3! is excluded
from power+ Whereas groups that fall into the two first categories are included,
those that belong to the last category are excluded+
The EPR classification offers subcategories for each of the three main status
categories:
1+ Included groups that rule alone can be either in monopoly or be dominant
depending on whether the control is total or allows for “token” representation+
2+ Included groups that share power play either a senior or junior role mea-
sured by their absolute influence over the cabinet+
3+ Excluded groups are either powerless if their access to power is blocked,
discriminated if the exclusion is systematic and targeted, and autonomous or
separatist, if they have been granted, or unilaterally secured, regional auton-
omy respectively+54
Our data set offers an important extension covering transnational groups between
ethnically related kin groups+ Since the coding of EPR groups is country specific,
there is no automatic way of identifying such connections+ We therefore decided
to code TEK links based on nominal identification by matching group names includ-
ing the possibility of synonyms for groups with shared languages+ Thus, for exam-
ple, Swiss Italians are linked to the Italians through the TEK group for all Italians+
There is, of course, no guarantee that matching names will yield politically rele-
vant bonds, and it is far from obvious whether Swiss Italians automatically will
identify with “Italian Italians+” However, this method is less afflicted by bias than
attempts to code constructivist interpretations based on partial information+55
The coders were asked to identify all ethnic groups that appear in more than
one country and to give them a special TEK code that differs from the country-
specific group identifiers+ Groups that appear in only one country were not given
any TEK code+ EPR also features “umbrella groups” composed of several ethnic
subgroups; for example, in Mali the umbrella group “blacks” includes ethnic Mande,
Peul, Voltaic, and others+ In these cases, the composite group can be associated
with more than one TEK code, with three as the maximum number of links allowed
in the data set+ Finally, before entering the analysis, TEK connections featuring
54+ In these cases, the autonomous group has no access to national executive power+ Autonomous
groups that are represented at the national level are coded as included+
55+ See the online appendix for a full listing of all TEK groups+
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groups from noncontiguous countries were removed from the data set in agree-
ment with the reasoning presented earlier+
Variables
Throughout this research note, we rely on a dependent variable that is based on a
group-level coding of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Data
Set+56 The resulting coding ensures that each conflict onset is mapped to the cor-
responding EPR group provided that the rebel organization expresses an aim to
support the ethnic group and members of the group in question participate in com-
bat+57 The onset variable is coded 1 for a group-year during which a conflict started,
and 0 otherwise+ We exclude observations with ongoing conflict+
Assuming that the group’s population is G, the TEK group’s population K,58
and the population of the incumbent I,59 we operationalize the main independent
variables as follows:
• Relative group size g  ~0,1! in the primary dyad is defined as G0~G  I !
if the group is excluded and as G0I if the group is included ~since the group
left the governing coalition, which is now of size I  G!+
• Relative TEK size k  @0,1! in the secondary dyad is defined as K0~K  I !+
• Relative size for TEK groups that are state controlling and stateless, kINCL
and kEXCL respectively, are computed based on TEK group populations from
either group category+
• We also employ a TEK dummy variable, which is coded 1 if the group has
at least one TEK group, and 0 otherwise+
We control for a number of group-level properties, including:
• Dummy variables for the EPR categories: junior partner, powerless,
discriminated, regional autonomy, and separatist autonomy ~using
senior partner in power sharing as the reference category, while dropping
all cases pertaining to monopoly and dominant status since groups cannot
challenge themselves!+
• Dummy variable downgraded, which indicates if the group suffered a loss
of EPR status during the last two years+
56+ Gleditsch et al+ 2002+
57+ Wucherpfennig et al+ 2012+
58+ Note that there may be more than one TEK group+ In such cases, K is the sum of the population
of segments in all neighboring countries+
59+ Note that the incumbent group can consist of several groups+ In this case, I is the sum of these
groups’ population+
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• Count variable previous conflicts which shows the number of conflicts
the group has experienced since 1946 or the country’s independence+
Finally, we introduce a number of variables to control for country-level properties:
• Dummy variable ongoing conflict, which indicates if there was an ongo-
ing conflict involving any other group in the country during the preceding
year+
• Logged gross domestic product ~gdp) per capita of the country, lagged+
• Logged population size of the country, lagged+
• Number of years since last conflict, as a nonlinear function, based on natu-
ral splines with three knots+60
Results
The sample encompasses all politically relevant EPR groups from 1946 through
2009, which amounts to 28,302 group years of which 203 include conflict onsets
~except those groups that control the government through monopoly or domi-
nance!+ Relying on robust country-clustered standard errors, we conduct all analy-
sis with logit models using the onset of ethno-nationalist conflict at the group level
as the dependent variable+
Table 1 introduces five models that test successively the hypotheses H1 through
H5+ Starting with an evaluation of H1, Model 1 confirms that larger relative group
sizes in the primary dyad increase the probability of conflict+61 The control vari-
ables behave as anticipated+ The group’s power access is negatively related to con-
flict+62 Downgraded groups and those with a history of conflict are more likely to
experience violence+ At the country level, GDP per capita has a negative and sig-
nificant effect, but the population variable fails to reach significance+
The remaining models assess the conditions within the secondary dyad+As a first
step,Model 2 introduces a dummy variable indicating whether the group has TEK+
Since the effect is indistinguishable from 0, we reject H2 in keeping with our theo-
retical expectations+ The introduction of the TEK dummy variable does little to affect
the other coefficients+ Focusing on H3, Model 3 evaluates whether the probability
of conflict increases monotonically with the relative size of the TEK group+ We
retain the TEK dummy, which now serves as an intercept for the linear effect for
groups without TEK, where the size is set to 0+Again, the estimate of the size effect
is far from significant, although this time positive+ In agreement with our theoret-
ical anticipation, we reject H3 as well+
60+ Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998+
61+ Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009+
62+ This result confirms Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010+
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Next, we test the postulated inverted U-shaped curvilinear relationship between
TEK size and conflict+ Since the indicator for the demographic balance ranges
from 0 to 1, both terms should be of roughly equal magnitude and the quadratic
term should be negative if the hypothesis is supported+ In support of H4, the esti-
mates of Model 4 reveal that while the monotonic effect of relative group size in
the primary dyad remains strong, the relative size of the TEK group influences
TABLE 1. Main regression results
Model 1
onset
Model 2
onset
Model 3
onset
Model 4
onset
Model 5
onset
relative group size 1+3885** 1+3807** 1+2713** 1+2622** 1+1783**
~0+3145! ~0+3131! ~0+3347! ~0+3404! ~0+3659!
tek group 0+1009 0+0179 0+4115
~0+1927! ~0+2092! ~0+2440!
relative tek size 0+3441 4+2382**
~0+3306! ~1+3420!
relative tek size, sq+ 4+2058**
~1+3620!
excluded tek group 0+1967
~0+2237!
relative tek size ~excl.! 3+3767*
~1+6882!
relative tek size ~excl.!, sq. 2+6340
~1+9853!
included tek group 0+3549
~0+2852!
relative tek size ~incl.! 4+5133**
~1+6719!
relative tek size ~incl.!, sq+ 5+1434**
~1+6867!
junior partner 0+8392 0+8415 0+7939 0+7823 0+7781
~0+5210! ~0+5207! ~0+5295! ~0+5248! ~0+5323!
regional autonomy 1+1844* 1+2021* 1+1249 1+1647* 1+1097
~0+5758! ~0+5741! ~0+5840! ~0+5811! ~0+5852!
powerless 1+4248** 1+4237** 1+3527* 1+3675* 1+3039*
~0+5294! ~0+5309! ~0+5430! ~0+5396! ~0+5458!
discriminated 2+0008** 1+9905** 1+9315** 1+9273** 1+8952**
~0+5048! ~0+5075! ~0+5194! ~0+5162! ~0+5177!
separatist 3+2109** 3+2137** 3+1275** 3+2512** 3+2108**
~0+6592! ~0+6609! ~0+6818! ~0+6625! ~0+6660!
downgraded 1+5762** 1+5768** 1+5756** 1+5585** 1+5537**
~0+2935! ~0+2942! ~0+2950! ~0+2922! ~0+2898!
previous conflicts 0+5571** 0+5481** 0+5469** 0+5173** 0+5070**
~0+0972! ~0+0968! ~0+0959! ~0+0963! ~0+0933!
ongoing conflict, lag 0+3876 0+3903 0+3960 0+4421 0+4634
~0+2882! ~0+2856! ~0+2866! ~0+2864! ~0+2856!
gdp/capita, lag, log 0+1672* 0+1707* 0+1674* 0+1777* 0+1918*
~0+0727! ~0+0722! ~0+0726! ~0+0728! ~0+0756!
population size, lag, log 0+0827 0+0866 0+0989 0+1198 0+1386
~0+0895! ~0+0889! ~0+0937! ~0+0957! ~0+0969!
constant 5+7704** 5+8275** 5+9053** 6+1146** 6+2274**
~1+0971! ~1+0901! ~1+1246! ~1+1326! ~1+1281!
Observations 28302 28302 28298 28298 28298
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; estimates for peace-year correction are not shown+ ** p , +01; * p , +05+
404 International Organization
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000064
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:30:04, subject to the Cambridge Core
conflict propensity in an inverted U-shaped fashion+ Encouragingly, both the lin-
ear and square terms are strongly significant, with the former being positive and
the latter negative+ Using 90 percent confidence intervals, Figure 2 plots the pre-
dicted probability of conflict as a function of relative TEK size, indicating that if
the other variables are held at their means, conflict propensity increases from around
0+003 to as much as 0+008 per group and year if the relative TEK size shifts from
0 to parity+ Illustrating the distribution of the observations, the rug plot along the
x-axis of Figure 2 demonstrates considerable variation in the observed relative
size of TEK groups+
Our analysis continues with an evaluation of H5, which considers the separate
effect of different types of TEK groups compared to the non-TEK baseline+ The
results of Model 5 suggest that both included and excluded TEK groups produce a
curvilinear effect on conflict onset+ However, it is difficult to compare the net influ-
ence of both these variables based on the coefficients themselves+ We therefore
refer to Figure 3, which displays the respective marginal TEK effects in two sep-
arate panels, with the left indicating included TEK groups and the right correspond-
ing to excluded groups+ The figure thus depicts the first differences in predicted
probabilities for given levels of relative TEK size and status compared to groups
FIGURE 2. The probability of conflict as a function of relative TEK size
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without TEK+ It immediately becomes clear that the effect differs significantly
between the two types of TEK groups+ In support of H5, the graphs show that for
comparable TEK sizes, the conflict propensity is considerably higher for excluded
TEK groups than for the included ones+ In fact, the conflict-restraining effect can
be observed for state-controlling TEK groups only+ For very large relative group
sizes, the effect appears to be significant since the error bands do not intersect 0 in
that range+ By contrast, the marginal effect of excluded TEKs is generally positive
and statistically significant for the intermediate size range, but becomes indistin-
guishable from the corresponding non-TEK situation for extreme values of the
size spectrum+ However, despite a falling tendency for large groups, the net effect
never becomes conflict dampening+ Echoing the findings of Saideman and Ayres,63
we conclude that irredentism may be much less important as a trigger of civil
wars than often expected, although we cannot exclude the possibility that other
types of violence, such as interstate disputes and wars, could be triggered by
included TEK groups+ Indeed, our results indicate that the conflict-dampening influ-
ence appears to be limited to included TEK groups, in line with Van Houten’s
account of the relatively peaceful Russian diaspora+64
In order to increase our confidence in our findings, we conducted a number of
sensitivity tests, presented in the online appendix+ We find that the results hold for
63+ Saideman and Ayres 2008+
64+ Van Houten 1998+
FIGURE 3. Change in conflict probability varying with size of included and
excluded TEK groups
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different parts of the world and are robust to several potentially confounding
factors+65
Conclusion
Thanks to improved data and analysis, this study has been able to provide consid-
erable empirical support for conjectures that have so far been postulated only theor-
etically, or shown to hold for selected cases+ In agreement with earlier studies, we
show that as the relative strength of ethnic kin groups increases, the risk of inter-
nal conflict also grows, but only up to a certain point+ After this point, further
increases in the ethnic kin’s demographic weight have a dampening impact on
conflict propensity+ Whereas the former part of the relationship is quite straight-
forward, the latter part is much less obvious, but nevertheless of great impor-
tance+ Indeed, it is this conflict-reducing influence of large “homelands” that enables
us to resolve our main puzzle relating to the relative peacefulness of the Russian
diaspora+ It is not surprising that the calming influence is limited to included, rather
than excluded, TEK groups, such as the Russians in Russia+ More generally, our
study offers a powerful answer to those who have played up the risks of irredent-
ism+ Our counterintuitive finding makes sense as soon as one realizes that large,
state-owning TEK groups are less likely to resort to risky border-crossing adven-
tures, and their presence puts pressure on incumbent states to treat their minorities
with foreign kin in a more considerate way than would otherwise have been the
case+
These findings do not imply that transnational politics is always more peaceful
than domestic dynamics+ In contrast to the conflict-inhibiting influence of large
state-controlling TEK groups, we find exactly the opposite effect for intermediate-
size kin groups+ Indeed, the probability of conflict hinges critically on the power
status of the TEK group+ Stateless communities, such as the Kurds ~outside Iraq!,
exhibit a much higher conflict potential compared to the within-country baseline+
Thus, the pernicious effect of political exclusion has a tendency to spill over state
borders+ Since marginalized communities have little to lose at home, they also are
more willing to upset the status quo abroad in the name of ethnic solidarity and
commonly felt grievances+
Although our main task has been to test empirically the curvilinear theoretical
conjecture and to evaluate TEK groups’ net impact on conflict, our empirical analy-
sis has important additional theoretical implications+ For one, our analysis stresses
the importance of considering nonlinear specifications rather than merely postu-
65+ See the online appendix at www+journals+cambridge+org0ino2013005+ In particular, there is evi-
dence that actual or prospective membership in the European Union influences the likelihood of irre-
dentist conflict when we included a dummy variable for such countries in our models+ However, this
modification does not change our main results+
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lating monotonic effects+ But our study also has general relevance for substantive
theory building+ By introducing the conceptual distinction between primary and
secondary dyads, we are able to unpack the “ethnic triad” originally introduced by
Weiner,66 while at the same time going beyond analysis that studies the influence
of ethnic kin as a dichotomous feature+67 Indeed, our results show that the power
balance in the primary and secondary dyads affects the risk of civil war in poten-
tially quite different ways+ The central curvilinear finding for the secondary dyad
dovetails nicely with international relations theory, especially the strands highlight-
ing the importance of uncertainty and deterrence+ Although several studies using
conventional balance-of-power theory have shown that the risk of conflict is the
highest at power parity, we do not find strong evidence of such an inverted U-shape
relationship in the primary dyad+ It seems intuitive that the secondary dyad involves
strategic considerations that have more to do with interstate relations than with
domestic politics, especially since transnational relations can be expected to fea-
ture more uncertainty than domestic dyads+ Yet more research is needed to clarify
the causal mechanisms operating in the primary and secondary dyads, as well as
possible interdependencies between them+
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